Pages

Thursday, October 21, 2010

In Case Fed Officials Needed More Evidence...

They should look no further than the Macroeconomic Adviser's monthly nominal GDP series.  This is a monthly indicator of total current dollar spending or aggregate demand in the United States.  It shows for August that aggregate spending declined at an annualized rate of decline of  1.69%.  More worrying, though, is that there is a downward trend in aggregate spending over the entire year. This downward trend is consistent with the quarterly forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters that show a drop in the NGDP forecast. Here is monthly NGDP (click to enlarge): 

 
Now these numbers only go through August.  I suspect all the recent QE2 talk--and its effect on   nominal expectations and thus on current spending--may have to some extent arrested  this downward trend in NGDP.  Still the Fed should not let its guard down come the November FOMC meeting.

What Would Milton Friedman Say About Monetary Policy Today?

That is a question William Ruger and I address in an article at Investor's Business Daily. William is a colleague of mine and has just finished a scholarly biography of Milton Friedman. Here is the introduction to our piece :
Four years after his death, Milton Friedman's thoughts on monetary policy remain as relevant today as they were 30 years ago. Even Fed Chairman "Helicopter Ben" Bernanke (whose nickname comes from Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" idea for overcoming deflation) has referenced the Chicago don as an inspiration for his actions.

However, Friedman's views may not be well understood even by those who would claim him as their intellectual fountainhead — which could be problematic for policy-making. So what would Milton Friedman say about our current monetary policy?
We make the case that Milton Friedman would be supportive of more aggressive monetary action at this time. We note that Milton Friedman argued (1) low interest rates do not necessarily mean monetary policy is accommodative, (2) the Fed should target expected inflation, (3) the Fed should do what is necessary to stabilize nominal income, and (4) the Fed is not out of ammunition. Points (1) and (4) are made by Friedman in this article.  Point (2) is outlined in Friedman's book Monetary Mishief.  Point (3) is pervasive throughout Friedman's writings, but here is a recent example.  Our article also draws from Scott Sumner who has made similar arguments  before  about Milton Friedman.  

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Lessons from the 1930s

Doug Irwin has a great article and podcast on the gold standard during the Great Depression.   Among other things, he notes that the countries that left the gold standard the earliest--a radical policy move at the time--were the first ones to experience economic recovery.  The whole discussion of how the gold standard contributed to the Great Depression is an interesting one and is instructive for today's economic issues.   I wish folks like Stephen Gandel, Tyler Durden, and David Rosenberg who see the Fed's QE2 not only as ill-conceived but as also having the potential to incite civil unrest would look to this period before making such claims.  If they did they would see how monetary experiments far more radical than QE2 actually ended the Great Depression.  They would also see that had such programs been implemented sooner  it is possible World War II may have been avoided.  Although a world war  is not imminent, there is the rising threat of a trade war.  And yes, there are lessons from the Great Depression even for this development. Here is Doug Irwin and Barry Eichengreen:
Today, the United States is in the position of the gold-standard countries in the 1930’s. It can’t unilaterally adjust the level of the dollar against the Chinese renminbi. Employment growth continues to disappoint, and fears of deflation will not go away. Lacking other instruments with which to address these problems, the pressure for a protectionist response is growing. 

So what can be done to address the situation without getting into a beggar-thy-neighbor, retaliatory free-for-all? In the deflationary 1930’s, the most important way that countries could subdue protectionist pressure was to use monetary policy actively to push up the price level and stimulate economic recovery. The same is true today. If fears of deflation were to recede, and if output and employment were to grow more vigorously, the pressure for a protectionist response would dissipate.

The villain of the piece, then, is not China, but the US Federal Reserve Board, which has been reluctant to use all the tools at its disposal to vanquish deflation and jump-start employment growth. Doing so would help to relieve the pressure in Congress to blame someone, anyone – in this case China – for America’s jobless recovery. Where the Bank of Japan has now led, the Fed should follow.
QE2 would get exported to China and other economies that peg to the dollar.  Obviously, this presents  problems for China and it may resist QE2, as we saw with their interest rate increase yesterday. In the long run, though, QE2 going to China and other places should provide added global stimulus and may even help rebalance the world economy.

A Natural Experiment in the Making

Martin Wolf makes an interesting point today in his column.  He argues that the divergent policy paths of the United States and the United Kingdom are providing a natural experiment on the efficacy of "expansionary" fiscal austerity:
The US and UK have similarities that go beyond speaking the same language: both had huge expansions in household credit; both had to rescue their financial sectors; both have watched their central banks push interest rates close to zero and adopt “quantitative easing”; and both have experienced massive post-crisis increases in fiscal deficits. Yet a big policy divergence is on the way. The coalition government of the UK will on Wednesday announce details of their cuts in government spending. Nothing comparable is expected in the US...What we do know is that the UK has launched a remarkable policy experiment. The contrast with the US should at least be instructive.
While this will make for an interesting comparison going forward,  it will be difficult to disentangle the effects of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy.  Martin wolf cites an IMF study in his column that speaks to this issue.  This study shows that many of so called "expansionary" fiscal contractions  occurred because monetary policy was providing accommodation via lower interest rates and/or a currency depreciation.  Scott Sumner made a similar point a while back.  He argued it is nearly impossible to estimate the true size of the fiscal multiplier and thus the actual effect of fiscal stimulus because monetary policy will typically offset such actions.  Still, the diverging policy paths of the US and UK  will be interesting to watch. 

Friday, October 15, 2010

Bernanke's Speech

After all the excitement from the FOMC minutes released earlier this week, Bernanke's speech was a bit of let down.  The FOMC minutes showed a number of participants had discussed explicit inflation, price level, or NGDP level targets as a way to better shape nominal expectations.  I was hoping for a follow-up from Bernanke today.  Instead, all we got was an acknowledgment of the obvious.  Others share a similar disappointment.  For example, here is James Politi:
Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve chairman, did not satisfy everyone’s desires for a decisive, comprehensive, statement on what the US central bank will be doing to address the sluggish recovery in his speech today in Boston.
For instance, he did not even touch some of the more radical moves to tackle inflation expectations that were mentioned in the minutes from the last FOMC meeting in September, such as a nominal gross domestic product target or a price level target.
And here is Brad DeLong:
I am still surprised at the Fed Chair we have. Where is the Fed Chair who was willing to try to get ahead of the problems in late 2008? Or the "Helicopter Ben" of 2003? Or the student of big downturns in Japan in the 1990s and the U.S. in the 1930s.
I hope Bernanke is simply holding his cards close to his chest as cautious central bankers tend to do.  If so, it still is far from optimal. If Bernanke plays his cards right in shaping nominal expectations, a dramatic expansion of the Fed's balance sheet may not be necessary.  All he and the rest of the Fed have to do is state an explicit nominal target and say that they will do whatever is necessary to maintain that target.  This would create far more certainty and better focus the market expectations than the current approach of trying to divine the Fed's true intentions.  We see glimpses of this possibility with the pick up in inflation expectations following all the QE 2 talk by Fed officials. So make it official Ben, announce an official NGDP level target!

P.S. Sorry, I couldn't resist putting in another plug for a NGDP level target in the last sentence. 

Thursday, October 14, 2010

About That Bretton Woods 2 vs. QE 2 Showdown...

Apparently it was the topic de jour at the IMF annual meetings this past weekend.  Though framed as a "currency war" by some IMF participants, Martin Wolf explains it is really about two rebalancing acts in the global economy:
The first is internal rebalancing – a return to reliance on private demand in advanced countries and retrenchment of the fiscal deficits that opened in the crisis. The second is external rebalancing – greater reliance on net exports by the US and some other advanced countries and on domestic demand by some emerging countries, notably China.
As noted by Wolf, it just so happens that both of these rebalancing acts can be addressed by one policy response: aggressive monetary easing by the Fed.  That now seems to be happening in the form of QE 2.   The Fed, though, is not purposely trying to tackle both  rebalancing acts.  Rather, it is simply trying to shore up aggregate demand (AD) in the U.S. economy and spur an economic recovery.  Doing so would solve the first rebalancing act.  Now because the Fed is a monetary superpower, its attempts to shore up U.S. AD will get exported to many other countries in the world, particularly those those dollar bloc countries that pegged in some form to the U.S. dollar and do so in a manner  that maintains external competitiveness.  It is these same countries that are a  key part of the second rebalancing act. They are not pleased by this development as it implies either (1) letting their currencies appreciate against the dollar and losing some external competitiveness or (2) intervening in foreign exchange markets to prevent this appreciation from happening and allowing a large expansion of their domestic money supplies. Either way, the second rebalancing act will occur: dollar block countries' currencies will appreciate or their domestic prices will increase.  

For the dollar block countries they see a "currency war" and want to fight back. For the Fed it sees weakening AD  and is determined to stabilize it.  So who will win this global economic showdown at the OK Corral?  Martin Wolf says there is no doubt to the eventual outcome of this exchange:
The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.
For all the talk of the U.S. demise, this showdown looks to be one where the United States gets to show it is still a superpower.

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

A Bombshell in the FOMC Minutes

Contrary to what some observers are saying, the FOMC minutes released today reveal a big change in terms of policy options being discussed by the Fed.  For the first time the FOMC has discussed the possibility of targeting the level of NGDP.  Here is the key excerpt (my bold):
With short-term nominal interest rates constrained by the zero bound, a decline in short-term inflation expectations increases short term real interest rates (that is, the difference between nominal interest rates and expected inflation), thereby damping aggregate demand. Conversely, in such circumstances, an increase in inflation expectations lowers short-term real interest rates, stimulating the economy.Participants noted a number of possible strategies for affecting short-term inflation expectations, including providing more detailed information about the rates of inflation the Committee considered consistent with its dual mandate, targeting a path for the price level rather than the rate of inflation, and targeting a path for the level of nominal GDP.
This is huge.  The FOMC is now discussing a NGDP level target, a topic that has has been promoted in the economic blogosphere. For those of us who have been advocating this approach for some time (e.g. here and here) this is incredibly refreshing.  Maybe they are listening to us after all.  Lest you think I am reading too much into the above excerpt from the FOMC minutes, here is what David Pearson, a money manager who follows the FOMC closely, had to say about it:
[T]he Fed is careful in how it chooses its words in both the statements and minutes. Minority views are often referred to in the context of “a few participants noted…” or, “one participant commented that…” Today’s minutes tell us that, “Participants noted a number of possible strategies…” Notice the lack of a qualifier. That this was used to describe the discussion of both price and NGDP level targeting implies a surprising degree of consensus and openness around something never floated before in the minutes. Further, when someone pounds the table and says, “no way”, the minutes usually will say something like, “one participant expressed a concern that adopting such strategies might risk unanchoring expectations…” To do otherwise would be to pretend an strong objection was not raised.

So apparently they all sat around a table discussing that price and NGDP level targeting might be a good thing, and no one blew a gasket. This, I believe, is news.
Unfortunately, we will have to wait until the transcripts are released in six years to learn who actually was discussing NGDP level targeting.