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Monday, November 8, 2010

Last Word on What Milton Friedman Would Say

So the debate over what Milton Friedman would say continues to be debated  by policymakers and other monetary luminaries. This debate started with an Op-Ed I coauthored with Will Ruger in the Investor's Business Daily, received more attention from a similar article by David Wessel in the Wall Street Journal, and was further promoted by Terence Corcoran in the Financial Post.  These articles upset the old school monetarists and apparently were discussed at a recent  Karl Brunner conference where they were gathered.  Next, Allan Meltzer published this Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal where he argued Friedman would not support QE2.  John Taylor chimed in that he agreed with Allan Meltzer's assessment.  I replied that even by Allan Meltzer's criteria of what Milton Friedman stood for one could make the case that he would still support some form of QE2.   And now the issue gets discussed by Ben Bernanke at the Jekyll Island conference. 

Now I really don't want to spend any more time on this debate, but given that it has not died down let me add these few final remarks.

(1) I agree with Paul Krugman that ultimately we should make our decisions about monetary policy without appealing to authority.  My original intent in publishing the Op-Ed was as a way to reach out to inflation hawks who claimed to be followers of Milton Friedman. I was hoping they would see Friedman's views were nuanced and that this would encourage them to take a more nuanced view.  Ultimately, though, economic analysis should be based on facts and good macroeconomic theory, not an appeal to authority. 

(2) With that said, the data do not lend themselves to the view that Friedman would necessarily be against QE2.  As I show in this post, all measures of broad money growth are far from stable and are low.  A properly executed QE2 could actually work to stabilizes these measures.  Moreover, Friedman actually said a monetary policy that targeted the expected inflation rate was better than a money supply target.  By that criteria there is no question he would support some kind of QE2.

(3) The only reason why Milton Friedman would be critical of QE2 is its ad-hoc nature.  While Friedman would be for restoring monetary equilibrium, he would want it to be done in a predictable, rule-like manner.  So far that has not happened.  It is likely he would have argued the Fed should adopt an explicit nominal target and commit to doing whatever is necessary to maintain it rather than the make-it-up-as-we-go-along approach behind the QEs so far. The economy needs more certainty now and  an explicit nominal target would help immensely on this front. 

Update: I failed to mention that Scott Sumner talked about what Milton Friedman would do long before I did.  In fact, my Op-Ed was motivated in part by his work on this topic.  

The Real Objective of QE2

I have noted several times now that our current economic problems are fundamentally the result of  excess money demand.  This understanding implies QE2 is ultimately about solving  an excess money demand problem.  Along these lines, Josh Hendrickson notes that the current excess money demand problem is unique because the Fed is paying interest on excess reserves:
With the Fed paying interest on reserves, open market operations literally entails the Fed exchanging debt for debt — specifically, Federal Reserve debt for Treasury debt...  it should be clear that the Fed is not being expansionary when it exchanges debt for debt. Nonetheless, this is not the same thing as saying that the Fed cannot be expansionary.

Some commentators have assumed that the sole effect of quantitative easing is to reduce long-term interest rates and stimulate investment. This is wrong-headed and demonstrates... why obsessions with the interest rate effect are misguided. The point of quantitative easing is not to reduce the long-term interest rate, but rather to resolve monetary disequilibrium.

Suppose that there is an excess demand for money. Since money is the medium of exchange and is traded on all markets, this necessarily causes an excess supply of goods and services. The central bank can eliminate the excess demand for money by increasing the money supply. However, as has been discussed above, if the central bank is exchanging interest-bearing reserves for interest-bearing debt, it is essentially exchanging perfect substitutes. If this is the case, traditional open market operations will not resolve the excess demand for money. Rather, the central bank needs to exchange the interest-bearing reserves for something that is not a perfect substitute. Potential assets that satisfy this criteria could be anything from long-term bonds to a portfolio of stocks. The central bank purchases these assets in order to increase the money supply and resolved monetary disequilibrium.
Read the rest of Josh's post here.  By the way, Josh just finished his Ph.D. and is on the job market.  Give him a look.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

Not Bad, But Where Is the Explicit Nominal Target?

There has been plenty said about the FOMC decision to go ahead with QE2.  Let me add that this plan could have packed a lot more punch if the Fed had committed to an an explicit nominal target.  Instead we get several loosey-goosey references in the FOMC press release about Fed needing to keep inflation  at a level consistent with its mandate.  To be fair, Ben Bernanke does mention in his Op-Ed today that most members of the FOMC believe 2% is the inflation rate consistent with a healthy economy. Still, there would be a lot more certainty and wallop to the Fed's action if it would just come out and say "The FOMC is now committed to a X% nominal target and will do whatever is necessary to maintain it." Doing so would go a long way in shoring up and stabilizing inflation expectations.  For some reason, though, the FOMC is afraid to make such an explicit commitment. Maybe it will still do so in the future.  And maybe, just maybe it will really be bold and commit to a NGDP level target.

Here are some of the discussions on the FOMC's decision: Scott Sumner, Ryan Avent, Mark Thoma, Brad DeLong, James Hamilton, Paul Krugman, Gavyn Davies, and Bill Craighead.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

A Reply to Those Who Claim We Misreprensented Milton Friedman

[Update: I see that Allan Meltzer has an Op-Ed in the WSJ where he argues Milton Friedman would not support Ben Bernanke's QE2.  He is responding to those people who "believe the great Nobel laureate would favor this inflationary program. I am certain he would not."  Meltzer's big counter argument is that "Friedman's main message for central banks was to maintain a monetary rule that kept the growth of the money supply constant."  The problem with this claim is that it ignores Friedman's call for the Fed to target the expected inflation rate.  As I show below, Friedman explicitly wrote this approach was better than targeting the money supply.  But even if we ignore this point, Meltzer's key argument about monetary stability still does not imply Friedman would be against QEII.  The growth rate of various money supply measures has fallen and are far from stable. If anything, QEII would move these monetary aggregates closer to a stable growth path. I would like to see how certain Allan Meltzer  is after grappling with these two points, both of which are discussed in my post below.]

There are some observers who find the article Will Ruger and I did on Milton Friedman very irritating.  They believe we have misrepresented his views.  A key complaint they have is that our analysis ignores Friedman's long-standing commitment to stable growth in the money supply. Okay, let us look at the recent growth path of the money supply.  Below is a graph showing the year-on-year growth rate of three monetary aggregates: M2, MZM, and M3.  The M3 data comes Capital Economics. (Click on figure to enlarge.)


The growth rates of the monetary aggregates have been anything but stable.  In fact,  M3 and MZM--arguably better measures of money during this crisis than M2--have had a recent run of negative growth. While M2 has had positive growth, it too appears below trend.  All of them have seen plunges in their growth rates.  Would Milton Friedman really look at this graph and conclude there has been monetary stability?

With that said, one should note that in this 2003 WSJ article Milton Friedman appears to have moved beyond aiming to just stabilize the growth of the money supply.  For in this piece he praises the Fed for adjusting M2  in response to a M2 "velocity bubble" in the 1990s. Friedman is endorsing the Fed's actions  at this time to offset money demand shocks. Thus, in this article he is implicitly calling for the Fed to stabilize the MV part of the equation of exchange (i.e. MV=PY).  So how does money velocity look right now? The graph below answers that question. It divides final sales of domestic product (a more accurate measure of AD than NGDP) by the monetary aggregates. (Click on figure to enlarge.)



Here again we see anything but stability. It is hard to believe that Friedman would not have been concerned by the pick up in money demand implied by this figure.  Moreover, he would realize the that these figures together (i.e. %ΔM +%ΔV) indicate that the growth path of nominal income has not been stable either. This too would have concerned him.  

Finally, it is worth repeating here that Friedman was supportive of the Fed adopting a target for expected inflation. He endorsed it in his book Money Mishief.  The idea was originally Robert L. Hetzel's.  In Hetzel's book The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve, he cites a letter Friedman wrote in 1991 where he says the following about this proposal (p. xiv):
It is the first nominal anchor that has been suggested that seems to me to have real advantages over the nominal money supply.  Clearly it is far better than a price level anchor which... is always backward looking.
So Friedman endorses this approach by saying it trumps targeting the money supply.  Now given that inflation expectations were headed down for most of the year (see here), it seems likely Friedman would be concerned on this front too. Only with the talk of QE2 in September did these expectations turn around. I suspect he would have been pleased.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Beckworth Smackdown Watch

Peter Boettke and friends take issue with the claim that Milton Friedman would support QEII. There is an interesting discussion there between the Austrians who take the excess money demand problem seriously and those Austrians who don't. Among other things, I learned from the comments that at a recent gathering of Monetarist luminaries the participants really disliked David Wessel's piece on Milton Friedman and by implication my piece too.  In my defense I never have claimed to be a monetarist, only a quasi-monetarist.

Why a NGDP Level Target Trumps a Price Level Target

Two recent articles speak to the advantages of a nominal GDP level target over a price level target.  The first article is from The Economist which actually discusses a price level target but in so doing actually builds the case for a NGDP level target. The Economist article first describes the benefits of a price level target:
Assume that inflation of 2%, on average, is ideal. This implies that if the price level is 100 this year, it will be 102 next year and 104 (or more precisely, 104.04) in the second year. If inflation is only 1% in one year, a conventional inflation-targeting central bank would aim only to return inflation to a rate of 2% the next. This would leave the price level at 103, lower than its original implied path. In contrast, a central bank that targets the price level wants to make up any lost ground on prices. It would seek to raise inflation to 3% in the second year to get to a target of 104.

In theory price-level targeting is superior to inflation-targeting because it provides more certainty about the long-term purchasing power of money. Central banks always target inflation flexibly. The Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, for example, target a rate of 2% but permit a range of 1% to 3%. That means someone making a 30-year investment must plan for cumulative inflation of as much as 143% or as little as 35%. A credible price-level target eliminates that uncertainty.
 So a price level target trumps an inflation target, but it has one glaring problem: it doesn't handle aggregate supply shocks very well. Here is The Economist:
There are questions, too, about how central bankers would deal with a one-time rise in the price level because of a new value-added tax, say, or higher oil prices. The boost to inflation would be temporary, but to the price level, permanent. In theory a central bank would have to wrestle all other prices lower no matter what the cost. It could make an exception, but too many exceptions would dent the bank’s credibility. Conversely, a positive shock such as lower oil prices or higher productivity that pushes prices lower would require the central bank to raise future inflation, driving down real interest rates and maybe risking an asset bubble.
Implicit to this discussion is that a price level target does great if the business cycle is dominated by aggregate demand (AD) shocks. But if aggregate supply(AS) shocks matter at all then a price level target can actually be destabilizing. Would we really want the Fed to tighten because a negative AS shock pushed up prices? This would require the Fed to further constrict an already weakened economy.  On the other hand, if there were a productivity boom that implied a higher neutral interest rate and lower inflation rate, would we really want the Fed pushing interest rates below the neutral rate and raising AD above trend growth just to keep the price level stable?

What then is left? Ramesh Ponnuru provides an answer in a National Review article titled "Hard Money" (sorry, no link):
Economists Scott Sumner of Bentley University and David Beckworth of Texas State University are among those who have suggested that the Fed should move gradually toward a new, more rule-bound and predictable monetary policy. The first step would be to signal to the markets that the Fed is willing to do whatever it takes to reach 2 percent average inflation. Over time the Fed would move to stabilize and then slow the growth of nominal GDP, which is the size of the economy as measured in a given year’s dollars. If the nominal GDP target was for 3 percent growth and the economy grew by 2 percent, there would be 1 percent inflation.

That policy would bind the Fed to a rule, thus reducing the uncertainty that recent policy has generated, including the risk that we will get galloping inflation at some point in the future. But it is superior to simply targeting the inflation rate, Beckworth argues, because it incorporates two worthwhile types of flexibility. It allows the price level to move in response to supply shocks: An oil embargo would cause prices to rise, a technological advance would have the opposite effect. And it allows the money supply to move up and down in response to the demand for cash: In periods such as late 2008, when people were holding on to their money, the Fed would have loosened more than it did. But since the rule would have required tighter money during the boom years, the financial crisis might not have been as severe in the first place.
So the answer is a NGDP level target.  There is some disagreement on exactly how fast NGDP should be growing and thus targeted.  However, supporters of a NGDP level target agree that the beauty of a NGDP level target is that it forces Fed to focus on stabilizing AD while ignoring potentially misleading signals coming from changes in the price level. In short, such a rule would force the Fed to focus on a cause of the business cycles, not a symptom of it. 

What Would Milton Friedman Do? Part III

Terrence Corcoran weighs in on the discussion of what Milton Friedman would recommend if he were alive today:
A cottage industry is building around the question: What would Milton Friedman do? With the U.S. Federal Reserve on the brink of announcing a new round of quantitative easing to pump a fresh supply of money into the U.S. economy, people are looking around for economic guidance. Prof. Friedman, the Nobel-winning free-market economist who died in 2006, earned his Nobel on the basis of his monetary-policy work. He was a “monetarist” who promoted the idea that steady and stable increases in the money supply were needed to keep growth high and inflation low.
The consensus, more or less, appears to be that Prof. Friedman would endorse what Fed chairman Ben Bernanke is expected to announce tomorrow: another massive increase in bond purchases. If the Fed buys up to half a trillion dollars’ worth of bonds, pushing interest rates even lower, the theory is that such quantitative easing will drive Americans into doing something constructive with their money, activity that would push up money-supply measures.
Here is the piece that Will Ruger and I did on the topic and here is the article by David Wessel.