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Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Calling the QE2 Wing of the Republican Party

Calling the Greg Mankiws and Ken Rogoffs of the Republican party: when will you get your own "open letter to Ben Bernanke" out?  Are the other guys really the true representation of Republican economists?  I hope not, but one cannot ignore the growing criticism of QE2 coming from conservative commentators.  Ramesh Ponnuru of the National Review considers why this is happening:
Over the last month, with astonishing rapidity, opposition to looser monetary policy has become the default position of the Right. Sarah Palin, Paul Ryan, and Mike Pence have all condemned QE2. Conservative worthies have written an open letter to Ben Bernanke urging him to cease and desist. Conservative pundits who have never previously expressed any interest in monetary policy are now alarmed by the prospect of (as some of them put it) “hyperinflation.”

[...]
I suspect that intellectual inertia is affecting conservatives’ assessment of this issue as much as the merits. As in so many other areas of policy thinking, conservatives are still reacting to the experience of the late 1960s through the early 1980s–when monetary restraint was exactly what the economy needed. The last decade, in which excessively loose policy at least abetted a ruinous bubble, has reinforced the conservative preference for tight money. But that preference is not applicable at all times and in all circumstances, and it is no longer 1979.

Yet conservatives are talking about runaway inflation at a time when the consumer price index, which itself is generally considered to overestimate inflation, has been registering 1-2 percent inflation. The spread between inflation-indexed and unindexed bonds has also yielded a market prediction of inflation in that range. Opponents of QE2 say that the Fed should not be deliberately raising expectations of future inflation. Maybe they’re right. But let’s have some perspective. If the Fed delivers on the 2 percent average inflation it seems to want, we’ll still be below the average inflation rates of each of the last five decades.
And let’s remember as well that both Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek would probably have favored something like QE2.

About that Runaway Inflation The Fed is Creating

I am having a hard time finding it when I look to inflation expectations.  Here is the average annual expected inflation rate over the next five years implied the spread between nominal and real yields on treasury securities:
(Click on figure to enlarge.)

Note that most of the pick up in expected inflation occurs during October when Fed official were talking up QE2. Since then inflation expectations have not exploded but drifted around where they had been, around 1.6%.  It is also worth noting in this figure that inflation expectations were steadily heading down for most of the year.  QE2 has reversed that, but has yet to push inflation expectations up to the 2.0% value the Fed would like to see it. Contrary to the rhetoric, then, QE2 is not the great inflation creating machine some claim it is. And just to be clear, it is not inflation per se that the Fed or supporters of QE2 ultimately want.  What they really want is to increase aggregate spending.  Raising inflation expectations would do that as I explain here.  If only the Fed would adopt a nominal GDP level target many of these problems would dissappear. 

Friday, November 12, 2010

My Kind of Hard Money

 Ramesh Ponnuru has a new article up at National Review titled Hard Money.   Ponnuru considers the difficult question of what the Fed can do to avoid both deflationary and inflationary spirals while at the same time promoting macroeconomic stability.  His conclusion is that the Fed should move to a NGDP level target.  I am glad to see this idea get a hearing at the National Review.  Take a look at this timely article.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Is There Any Hope for Improving the Fed?

For those of us disappointed with the Fed's performance over the past decade, it is natural to wonder if the conduct of monetary policy will be better going forward.  Well, if history is any guide then don't get your hopes up.  That is the conclusion  I draw from a new paper by George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White where they systematically explore the Fed's performance since its inception in 1913.  Here is the abstract:
As the one-hundredth anniversary of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act approaches, we assess whether the nation's experiment with the Federal Reserve has been a success or a failure. Drawing on a wide range of recent empirical research, we find the following: (1) The Fed's full history (1914 to present) has been characterized by more rather than fewer symptoms of monetary and macroeconomic instability than the decades leading to the Fed's establishment. (2) While the Fed's performance has undoubtedly improved since World War II, even its postwar performance has not clearly surpassed that of its undoubtedly flawed predecessor, the National Banking system, before World War I. (3) Some proposed alternative arrangements might plausibly do better than the Fed as presently constituted. We conclude that the need for a systematic exploration of alternatives to the established monetary system is as pressing today as it was a century ago.
In short, it is difficult to make the case that Fed has truly made a meaningful improvement in macroeconomic stability over its almost 100 years of existence.  Sigh.     

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

QE2 Will Not Usher in the Apocalypse

Though some folks would have you believe so.  It is far from perfect--it needs an explicit nominal target to make it truly effective--but it is a step in the right direction. Martin Wolf agrees:
The sky is falling, scream the hysterics: the Federal Reserve is pouring forth dollars in such quantities that they will soon be worthless. Nothing could be further from the truth. As in Japan, the policy known as “quantitative easing” is far more likely to prove ineffective than lethal. It is a leaky hose, not a monetary Noah’s Flood.
[...]

 The sky is not falling. But this does not mean the Fed’s policies are the best possible. It is probable that any impact on the yields on medium-term bonds will have a modest economic effect. It would be far better if the Fed could shift inflation expectations upwards, by issuing a commitment to offset a prolonged period of below-target inflation with one of above-target inflation.
In other words, Wolf believes QE2 may not pack a real economic punch in the absence of price level target.  Michael Woodford, William Dudley, Charles Evans, and  Paul Krugman agree with this assessment.  I too am a fan of level targeting (versus growth rate targeting), but would prefer to see it done by targeting some measure of aggregate spending such as final sales of domestic product or nominal GDP.  There are good reasons to favor an aggregate spending level target over a price level target, but either approach would bring the nominal economy closer to its trend and in turn spur real economic growth.  Unfortunately, though, the FOMC for some reason has chosen not to adopt a level target. This decision may amount to keeping the United Sates in economic purgatory.  So, rather than worrying about QE2 ushering in the apocalypse worry about it being much ado about nothing. 

US-China Currency Rap Battle

No explicit mention of QE2 is this rap video, but it covers all the other economic issues facing Chimerica:

Monday, November 8, 2010

Memo to the Fed: Fix the Aggregate Demand Externality

Paul Krugman makes an important point in his NYT column: there is an excess money demand problem (my bold below):
For the big concern about quantitative easing isn’t that it will do too much; it is that it will accomplish too little... The only way the Fed might accomplish more is by changing expectations — specifically, by leading people to believe that we will have somewhat above-normal inflation over the next few years, which would reduce the incentive to sit on cash.
Yes, somewhere there are households and firms that are sitting on excess money balances.  And understand these are not the debt-strapped households and firms that should be refraining from further spending.  No, these are the households and firms that are creditors and thus the beneficiary of the debtors who are now saving more.  Instead of spending their growing stock of money they are sitting on it because they see an uncertain economic future.  Here is the rub: it doesn't have to be this way.  If these creditor household and firms all simultaneously started spending their excess money balances this would increase aggregate spending and in turn spur the real economy.* Moreover, knowing that the real economy would improve going forward would feed back and reinforce current aggregate spending. A virtuous cycle would take hold and push the economy back toward full employment.  But this not happening,  there is still an excess money demand problem.  No creditor household or firm wants to be the first mover and spend his/her money for a good reason: there is no guarantee anyone will follow.   This amounts to a negative aggregate demand (AD) externality.  

In order to fix this AD externality one needs an entity powerful enough to incentivize all the creditor households and firms to start spending their money simultaneously. Enter the Federal Reserve. It alone can change inflation expectations and thus motivate these creditors to start spending.  Note that by changing inflation expectations the Fed is really changing expectations of future aggregate spending, the source of  expected inflation.  And by changing expectations of future aggregate spending it is changing the economic outlook for the better too.  The Fed, then, is the one entity that can kick-start this virtuous aggregate spending cycle.  However, in the absence of an explicit nominal target to shape inflation expectations it is not clear to me the Fed will be successful in fixing this aggregate demand externality.   

*It is not always the case that an increase in total current dollar spending will shore up the real economy.  But it is the case now because (1) there is resource slack and (2) there are sticky wages and prices.